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Chapter 7

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Alexander Klimburg and Louk Faesen

Cyberspace¹ is managed by stakeholders from civil society, the private sector, and, to a lesser degree, by governments. The latter, however, is increasingly asserting its role in cyberspace, leading to a redistribution of power in which states are not only competing with other stakeholders, but also among each other. All cyberspace users thus face a power struggle between states that stands to affect the private sector and civil society, the multistakeholder approach to managing Internet resources, and therefore cyberspace writ large.

This chapter appropriates a realist model in international relations—the balance of power theory (BOP)—and adjusts it with neoliberal concepts of power to help better understand the challenge of stability between states in and on cyberspace. It specifically enables the “cybered” international relations of governments to be analyzed against the backdrop of the complex ecosystem of stakeholders. This does not presuppose that states are or should be the most important or influential actors in cyberspace. Instead, this chapter focuses on state interests. It identifies two conditions of the BOP theory and applies them to cyberspace in three different scenarios previously suggested by states, and offers one suggestion on the way forward.

THE BALANCE OF POWER

*“The greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order. In its absence, the awesome available power is unrestrained by any consensus as to legitimacy . . . without it stability will prove elusive.”*²

The balance of power theory is one of the most enduring and protean concepts in international relations.³ It has also sometimes proven to be the

battle line between both neorealist and neoliberal interpretations in international relations scholarship. This largely has been because of different interpretations of the term “anarchy” in international relations, and different assessments of the propensity of states to actually collaborate, besides a fundamentally different assessment of what constitutes “power.” This has sometimes amounted to wasted opportunity, since it is possible to apply more neoliberal views to BOP, both by stressing the importance of institutions as well as including a wider concept of power per se. This is even possible when taking many neorealist positions as a starting point.

For instance, a common point of departure for BOP is the basic assumption that states act rationally to maximize their security or power in anarchic systems without a higher authority to regulate disputes.⁴ Robert Jervis lists four realist assumptions that constitute the foundation of this premise: (i) all states must want to survive, (ii) they are able to form alliances with each other based on short-term interests, (iii) war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft, and (iv) several of the actors have relatively equal military capabilities.⁵ The system ensures that any one state’s power will be checked by a countervailing (coalition of) power that is alarmed by the potential hegemonic threat it poses to the system. From here on, the perspectives on the BOP theory diverge: one of them views the active goal of states as pursuing strategies designed to maintain the balance, while another maintains that it is an automatic consequence of state behavior, a side effect.⁶ As its name implies, the distribution of power, usually defined in terms of military capabilities, is central to the BOP theory.⁷ In particular, rough parity among several competing actors is frequently posed as a necessary feature of such a system. Even though the invisible hand of the balance of power regulates the system, states must be moved by explicit concerns over a potential hegemon and be ready to counter it with checks and balances as they struggle to curb the rise of a potential hegemon. As we shall see later, this becomes complicated if one departs from the realist definition of power as being purely military and adopts a wider understanding of what power may entail.

Fundamentally, the balance of power is based on a compromise—it cannot satisfy every actor in the international system completely. As Kissinger described, “Paradoxically, the generality of dissatisfaction is a condition of stability, because were any one power totally satisfied, all others would have to be totally dissatisfied. The foundation of a stable order is the relative security—and the relative insecurity—of its members.”⁸ The balance of power works best when it keeps one state from predominating and prescribing laws to the rest, and prevent the aggrieved parties from seeking to overthrow the international order. It does not purport to avoid crises or even wars. Its goal is not aimed at reaching peace, but rather moderation and stability.

Defining Cyber Power

Traditional understanding of the balance of power where states seek to survive as independent entities in an anarchic global system can seem particularly challenged when confronted with the concepts of *cyber power*. In a contemporary world with powerful norms against conquest, states no longer fear the same degree of physical extinction. The empirical evidence of limited military intervention for balancing purposes attests to the need to expand the traditionally military-security notion to include a wider range of means—including not only economic but also “soft power” factors.⁹ Indeed, the challenge is that in cyberspace many (but not all) of the traditional realist measures of state power do not seem to hold up, and it is, therefore, necessary to reconceive of what power means in cyberspace.

Power, however elusive and difficult to measure, goes beyond the physical or military supremacy over another. Joseph S. Nye offers guidance by describing *cyber power* as a unique hybrid regime of physical properties (the infrastructures, resources, rules of sovereignty, and jurisdiction) and virtual properties that make government control over the former difficult. Low-cost attacks from the virtual or informational realm can impose high impacts and costs on the physical layer. The opposite is also true; control over the physical layer can have territorial and extraterritorial effects on the virtual layer.¹⁰ Daniel Kuehl defines *cyber power* as “the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events in other operational environments and across the instruments of power.”¹¹ In line with his distinction between hard and soft power, Nye conceptualizes three faces of power: (i) the *coercive* ability to make an actor do something contrary to their preferences or strategies, (ii) *agenda setting* or framing to preclude the choices of another by exclusion of their strategies, and (iii) *shaping* another’s initial preferences so that some strategies are not even considered.¹² This chapter focuses on the first face, gives a cursory glance at the second, and only touches upon the third. This is not a reflection of relative importance of the respective faces of power (indeed some scholarship might consider the opposite to be the case), but rather a focus on the measurability (or at least observability) of the faces of power. It must be noted that none of the faces of power are easily quantifiable. There is no question that the measurement becomes abstract. The more indirect the power relation is, the more difficult measurement becomes—that is, the third face of power is more difficult to measure using traditional international relations methods.

The *hard power* manifestation of the first face of power in cyberspace, which comes close to the realist interpretation of power, is the ability to infringe on the availability and integrity of data. This can be accomplished either through denial of services (e.g., DDoS) or by various methods designed to influence data integrity (e.g., destructive malware insertion by

various means). To accomplish these activities, some capability is often equally required in the non-kinetic field of “espionage”—that is, the ability to violate the confidentiality of data. This precursor, formally known as Computer Network Exploitation (CNE),¹³ has since been refined to include capabilities known as ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and OPE (operational preparation of the environment, a.k.a. “preparing the battlefield”).¹⁴ Thus, it is logical that the capability of states to inflict kinetic-effect harm in cyberspace requires (to various extents) the ability to conduct intelligence gathering.¹⁵ However, the exact nature of these “kinetic-equivalent” effects, formally simply known as “Computer Network Attack” and now known as “Offensive Cyber Effect Operations” (OCEO),¹⁶ is in doubt. While some cyber capabilities are reserved for the battlefield (e.g., to take out a radar to enable an air strike) and are at least somewhat defined and even considered as “cyber fires,”¹⁷ other capabilities are less clear. For instance, OCEO targeted at a power grid could of course mean “switching off the grid.” But it could also mean “destroying the grid” to many different degrees, including to the extent that it was not easily reconstitutable. And finally, it could also mean something completely different—where, for instance, the power grid is simply repositioned to be used as an espionage tool,¹⁸ or even as a weapon itself. This lack of clarity on what exact capabilities in cyberspace are means that it is very difficult to describe comprehensively what the “means” (delivery systems or weapons) are. In some cases, this might seem relatively easy—Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu Shamoon, Ouroboros, and Dark Energy, come to mind as examples of somewhat classifiable “cyber weapons,” but in other cases, this would be much more difficult. For the purposes of arms control or similar, the lack of transparency in presumed force deployment and even the method of operation or intended effects make the task extremely difficult, at least if an “arms control treaty” is the goal. At best, a “cyber weapon” remains a weapon system of “omni-use” technologies that is extremely difficult for another state to verify due to a lack of transparency. Otherwise, however, states are only left with the ability to presume—basically to guess—the overall capability of another state (albeit at widely varying degrees of detail) without, in most cases, being able to detail the exact order of battle, table of equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures or other basic information—unless the intelligence assessment is very complete.

Leaving the definitional hurdles aside, the equilibrium of forces or the military balance of power in cyberspace is further complicated by characteristics unique to these tools:

- The success of an attack is more a reflection of the overall quality of defence rather than the quality of offense. An attacker will, therefore,

always use the “cheapest” tools available, and not necessarily the most advanced.¹⁹

- The vast majority of offensive cyber effects can only be deployed using civilian intermediaries (networks, products) that also can be part of a neutral or even friendly third nation.
- The difference between imminent preparation for attack (e.g., OPE) and simple espionage can be hard to distinguish for the defender, making inadvertent escalation much more likely due to a failure to correctly interpret intent.
- Offensive capabilities are much cheaper and much easier to develop and deploy than the total sum of necessary defensive measures.²⁰
- Unlike conventional weapons, “cyber weapons” can be reused but are also perishable—an entire arsenal can be rendered useless without ever being used once the vulnerability is patched.²¹
- These tools are specific—the outcomes are dependent on the victim’s network—and can be immediate or time-delayed. They upend conventional ways of response.
- They can also be reverse engineered, weaponized and reused by the victim or another party that gets their hands on the technology.²²
- They not only undermine the target’s security but also compromise the security of other actors using systems with the same vulnerabilities.²³

These are just a small range of examples describing how the fundamental differences between cyber and conventional weapons greatly complicate the process of parsing state offensive cyber capabilities.

But even in the physical world, Kissinger states that “an exact balance is impossible, and not only because of the difficulty of predicting the aggressor. It is chimerical, above all, because while powers may appear to outsiders as factors in a security arrangement, they appear domestically as expressions of a historical existence. No power will submit to a settlement, however well-balanced and however secure, which seems totally to deny its vision of itself.”²⁴ Power is thus conceived and assessed not merely as a mathematical exercise (the number of weapons or military capabilities) but takes into account the perception of a nation’s leaders, the quality of its strategies, military doctrines, and its will to use power effectively. Therefore, the common perception of a state’s cyber capabilities, even if founded on incomplete knowledge, can function as a basis for calculating the respective balance of power.

Legitimacy

A balance of power makes the overthrow of international order physically difficult, deterring a challenge before it occurs. A broadly based principle of

*legitimacy produces reluctance to assault the international order. A stable peace testifies to a combination of physical and moral restraints.*²⁵

According to Kissinger's theory, a balance of power is not in itself an adequate basis for order. It is regarded as a minimal condition, but if it becomes an end in and of itself, it becomes self-destructive: "a system based purely upon power will turn every decision into a contest of strength, whereas the essence of stability is the recognition of limits by major actors."²⁶

If nations desire peace, they cannot seek it directly. Instead, they must focus on creating stable relations among nations, which, according to Kissinger, is based on two major conditions: the existence of a balance of power and the acceptance of an international system of mediation and legitimacy by the major powers—an acceptance he terms "the legitimizing principle" or "the principle of legitimacy." These two terms should be conceptualized as conditions that form the basic hypotheses about the ideal conditions for the effective functioning of the system.²⁷

This brings us to the second condition of stability—which commonly results not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy. It means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that it expresses its discontent in terms of a revolutionary foreign policy. The legitimizing principle reflects the prevailing values of the historical epoch, especially how the international order should be organized in a specific context, and captures a general acknowledgment or consensus among the major actors in a system on what is considered to be the principal form of organization and order.²⁸ This principle identifies the *what*—the central actors—and the *how*—the types of interactions—in the international system. The peace of Westphalia, for example, marked a change in the legitimizing principle from feudalism to the system of sovereign nation-states. The legitimizing principle is often summarized as a "recognition of limits" by the state. It is important to understand that these limitations are not necessarily only legal or institutional but also include the understanding of what the actual and normative reality means.

In the context of cyberspace, the system for governing global cyber activities is primarily construed within its technical reality. The various interlocking but separate governance processes that together define cyberspace have been described by Joseph S. Nye as forming a "regime complex."²⁹

This regime complex is only partially influenced by state actors, and by bilateral, regional, or multilateral processes. The private sector and civil society both generate products, common practices, and norms of behavior

sector, and governments. For the Internet, this is seemingly grounded in reality. It is the members of civil society (which includes state-funded university researchers, as well as corporate engineers working on their own time) who write the code of the Internet. It is the private sector that builds and owns most aspects of the Internet, ranging from the cables to the services, to products and software which runs on and in it. Government's role is relatively limited in that respect. Its power is manifested through its sovereign rights and jurisdiction. While there are fine-tuned differences between the exact definition of the multistakeholder approach, for instance, between Western nations and China (Russia, by and large, still rejects the term entirely), there are more questions of applicability and responsibility. Both definitions, however, implicitly agree that the cyberspace domain overall is a multistakeholder one—even if they disagree on exactly what the respective authorities of the actors among each other are, or at what “level” of governance and what kind of authority is applicable.

The ability of governments to successfully manage the threat of major conflict in cyberspace is, therefore, not only hampered by the rapid development of digital technologies but also the dominant role of non-state actors in all shapes and forms (attacker, victim, media or carrier of attacks), as well as their unclear relationships with the government. Traditionally, all questions related to international peace and security occur within the governmental remit of states and the UN First Committee, while in reality governments only constitute one of three stakeholder groups in the wider cyberspace ecosystem. Failure to reach meaningful progress at the multilateral level has led other civil society and industry to become more involved in developing rules of the road.³⁰ This is not the first time that this has occurred—nongovernmental groups have previously helped reshape global discussions on responsible behavior.³¹ Governments and international organizations are beginning to recognize the need for industry and civil society involvement at the traditionally state-led multilateral level. Initiatives such as the “Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace,”³² the “UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation,”³³ and the civil society and industry consultations of the “UN Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Communications Technologies in the Context of International Security”³⁴ are testament to this development.

Finally, there is the question of the ideological connotation of the multistakeholder model itself, opening the door for further neo-corporatist influence over the governance structure. While many of these points are worthy of further examination and debate, there is often the assessment on par with liberal democratic systems that it might be one of the worst systems out there, but still better than the alternatives. Support for the multistakeholder

approach should not just be based on the notion of simply being “inclusive.” Instead, they allow for decision- and policy making to be informed and shaped by the relevant and authoritative sources. Within the complex context of cyberspace, it’s not an ideology, but a necessity—the removal of the private sector and civil society from the Internet governance architecture is simply not physically possible.

Given this complex landscape, it is unlikely there can be a singularly encompassing entity successfully acting unilaterally across the entire regime complex. If, for instance, governments, as an overall actor group, were to agree to make definitive changes to the current non-state-dominated Internet governance structures, then there would almost certainly be a strong reaction—not only from the private sector but also from the engineers and hobbyists who have coded most of the backbone of the Internet. Installing an intergovernmental organization instead of, for instance, the Internet Engineering Task Force, would not simply make these volunteers stop working on Internet technology. Therefore, the most basic reality of the wider cyber regime complex is that it is in its own, precarious, multistakeholder balance. While states can and may expand their own arrangements among each other, certain basic realities of how the domain is managed cannot be changed. Nothing that completely goes against the diffused power structure of cyberspace can, therefore, be considered viable or “legitimate”—the multistakeholder approach is, therefore, in effect, the Westphalian System of the Internet.

BALANCING POWER IN CYBERSPACE

Thus far, it has become apparent that an equilibrium of state forces in cyberspace remains elusive because of the lack of a basic understanding of each other’s capabilities and doctrines and, therefore, also a minimum amount of agreed definitions. Moving beyond power, the legitimizing principle reflects the recognition of the limits of states in the prevailing reality of the historical epoch. In cyberspace, this arguably can be expressed as the multistakeholder approach because of the technical reality of cyberspace that prevents one party from deciding universally and unilaterally.

From a state perspective, there are different ways to achieve a balance of power. In the next section, the guiding principles will be applied to three scenarios proposed by states that roughly correspond to the first three committees of the UN General Assembly to see how likely they can actually lead to a balance of power that upholds to the legitimizing principle. This does not mean that the UN is or should be the sole means through which to establish international peace and stability in cyberspace. Instead, it offers a starting

point to identify initiatives that have been previously proposed by governments, and one suggestion on the way forward.

First Basket, First Committee Issues

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly deals with issues of disarmament and international security. As previously mentioned, states make up only one of the three actor groups within the overall cyber regime complex despite their traditional dominance over all questions related to international peace and security in cyberspace, meaning they cannot decide on all aspects by itself—ownership is shared with the private sector and civil society. Yet, the involvement of non-state stakeholders in the international state-led processes remains limited at best. The last UN GGE Consensus Report (described below) seems to acknowledge the need to involve other stakeholders in its conclusions: “while States have a primary responsibility to maintain a secure and peaceful ICT environment, effective international cooperation would benefit from identifying mechanisms for the participation, as appropriate, of the private sector, academia and civil society organisations.”³⁵

Using Nye’s cyber regime complex as a point of departure, one of the authors expands Joseph Nye’s regime complex to offer an impression of the stakeholders and respective processes affecting the political-military dimension of cybersecurity, a.k.a. “international cybersecurity” or “international peace and security in cyberspace” that could be considered UN First Committee issues.

In the UN context, the First Committee is most concerned with guiding responsible state behavior in terms of international peace and security in cyberspace. To this end, there have been three major state efforts in the UN.³⁶

1. **The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.** Since its inception in 2010, the GGE has convened five times and issued three consensus reports. Each group had a mandate of only one year—which, until now, has been renewed on an annual basis. The first consensus report recommended that states consider norms, confidence-building measures (CBMs), and capacity-building initiatives to “reduce the risk of misperception” in cyberspace.³⁷ In the second consensus report, major powers explicitly recognized for the first time that the application of international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is essential to maintaining peace and stability in cyberspace.³⁸ It also encouraged the development of regional confidence-building




Figure 7.2 The Cyber Regime Complex by Stakeholder Group: The “International Cybersecurity” Cluster. *Source:* Alexander Klimburg, “To the GGE and beyond,” UNIDIR Cyber Stability Conference Series, 17 July 2016, Geneva. Available at: www.unidir.ch/files/conferences/pdfs/looking-ahead-the-gge-and-beyond-en-1-1173.pdf.

measures. The third consensus report outlines voluntary peacetime norms states are encouraged to follow. The 2016–2017 iteration failed to reach a consensus report. The stumbling block: the application of international law to cyber operations.³⁹ In more recent developments, the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly saw proposals from the United States⁴⁰ and Russia⁴¹ to create two parallel working groups, a reiteration of the GGE and a proposal for a new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), within the disarmament machinery to develop rules for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which are widely seen as two competing processes. Both processes establish modalities for multilateral engagement, yet the OEWG presents a wider scope for consultation with non-state stakeholders in the private sector and civil society communities. Meaningful participation and input is by no means a given, as it is still unclear as to what kinds of results these modalities will lead to in practice.

2. Members of the **SCO** have circulated a draft international code of conduct for information security at the UN General Assembly.⁴²

The code proposes that states voluntarily forego the “use of [ICTs] . . . to carry out activities which run counter to the task of maintaining international peace and security.” It predominantly focuses on interstate cooperation against the use of ICTs to incite the “three evil –isms”—terrorism, separatism or extremism—as well as reinforces a multilateral model for Internet governance and the notion of noninterference in the internal affairs of states through ICTs. The code has been floated at the UN since 2011, but has attracted criticism for its perceived incompatibility with human rights law.⁴³

3. Finally, the **UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 2003**, calling on states to build a culture of cybersecurity by encouraging domestic stakeholders to be aware of cybersecurity risks and to take steps to mitigate them.⁴⁴

Other multilateral initiatives to enhance international security and stability have been agreed outside of the auspices of the UN, most notably, the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and other regional organizations on CBMs. In addition, previous efforts have been made toward potential control of “intrusion software” by the Wassenaar Arrangement that aimed at “creating a consensus approach to regulate conventional arms and dual-use goods and services.”⁴⁵ It has forty-one signatories that regulate the export of both conventional weapons and dual-use goods, which includes certain categories of information systems.⁴⁶ In 2013, the member states agreed to include certain categories of intrusion software to this list.⁴⁷ Although this may bolster states against network intrusions, it also significantly impedes the ability of information security researchers to exchange findings without risking criminal proceedings.

Despite these efforts, the year 2017 marked the shortcomings of meaningful interstate efforts to advance norms and legal interpretations to bring international security and stability. This is just one way to do so. Some experts foresee a more fruitful future for operational cooperation—for example, in CBMs,⁴⁸ while others are exploring countering efforts to the proliferation of offensive cyber capabilities.⁴⁹

The most likely application of a balance of power framework could be through the field of arms control, which is traditionally the only venue where states openly consider trade-offs in their individual security in the name of broader peace. It would also be the most difficult to achieve—the last twenty years have shown that the arms control discussion in cyberspace has been beset with challenges, from applying overtly traditional models of negotiation (only including governments) to the inability to even agree on basic terms. As noted before, the notion of what constitutes a “cyberweapon” is as open

and contentious as the concept behind “cyber power” per se, and there is no definition of a cyberweapon or even cyber capabilities that would lend itself to negotiations. Russia and China still view cyber threats in fundamentally different ways as the United States (e.g., information weapons versus cyber tools), making it difficult to establish and enforce such a framework. There are some workarounds that have been suggested, such as the focus on simply regulating certain “effects” rather than trying to define the weapons. However, they also stumble over some basic differences in understanding of international law. Currently, the open questions in international law, particularly the status of data as an object,⁵⁰ are almost as difficult as technical understanding of what could comprise a “weapon” in cyberspace, mainly due to the dual-use or omni-use nature of many of the potential subcomponents in a “cyberweapon,” and the need for the technical community, researchers, or the private sector to be able to provide security tools for testing.

The introduction of two competing processes within the First Committee neither represent encouraging developments in this regard, signifying that divergent views between UN member states, in particular between liberal democracies and autocracies, persist even despite progress that may have previously been made through the GGE. However, if these hurdles can be overcome, the ability to at least agree on a counter-proliferation agreement (similar to the Missile Technology Control Regime or the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) is theoretically possible.⁵¹ Such an agreement would clarify both concepts and capabilities of signatory states, as well as limit the transfer of those capabilities to other actors (including non-state actors). If such a treaty neither violated the need of the technical community to have simple and easy access to security testing tools, nor set a dangerous precedent by trying to “outlaw” individual pieces of code globally, then it could arguably provide for a much-needed dose of predictability among states.

Second Basket, Second Committee Issues

The Second Committee of the United Nations General Assembly focuses primarily on economic and financial issues, and has a strong connection to the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The council is covered by the schedule officers from both the Second and Third Committees. The primary issue on the committee’s agenda is the “digital economy”—an issue predominantly discussed outside of the auspices of the United Nations, by institutions such as the EU, OECD, G20, G7, WEF, to name but a few. The digital economy includes specific issues such as digital trade, e-commerce, infrastructure development, and industry 4.0.

In this context, however, a closer look will be taken at law enforcement cooperation as a potential approach to establish a balance of power. Admittedly, law enforcement cooperation can also be categorized under the First or Third Committee issues. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime established by the Council of Europe and open to third party members is one of the most authoritative in this context, but has been criticized because it seemingly enforces a Western narrative.⁵² In response, Russia has reportedly proposed a draft convention on countering cybercrime and promoting law enforcement cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations, as it apparently believes previous conventions threaten the sovereignty of independent states.⁵³

The area of law enforcement cooperation offers some possibilities for pursuing a balance of power approach between states. First, in this context, the power of states is at least partially framed by the second and the third face of power considerations—co-option and conviction of soft power, besides the overall perceived coercive “hard power” strength of its suspected military and intelligence cyber capabilities. Second, a state can relatively easily ramp




Figure 7.3 The Cyber Regime Complex by Stakeholder Group: “Law Enforcement” and “Civil Rights” Clusters. *Source:* Alexander Klimburg, “To the GGE and beyond,” UNIDIR Cyber Stability Conference Series, 17 July 2016, Geneva. Available at: www.unidir.ch/files/conferences/pdfs/looking-ahead-the-gge-and-beyond-en-1-1173.pdf.

up its engagement in negotiations in this space, but it will be a credible actor only if it has a strong reputation in general and in the “rule of law” in particular—not necessarily the easiest of all criteria to fulfill. Third, it allows states to address the issue of malicious non-state actors that impact their national security concerns, including, for instance, countering the terrorist use of ICTs. Finally, a law enforcement approach that concentrates on mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs), rather than specifying specific crimes, does not contradict the legitimizing principle.

The limitations of the benefits of the law enforcement treaty approach to achieve a balance of power are based upon a simple understanding of what power in cyberspace is. Such a treaty would theoretically have little bearing on a state’s ability to conduct offensive cyber operations and, therefore, would not impact its “hard power” capabilities, unless the government in question clandestinely leverages cybercrime actors to buttress its own governmental capabilities. In the latter case, such a treaty would represent a clear loss for the cybercrime-supporting side, and a number of governments probably do fall into this category, limiting decisively their actual power gains as well.

A law enforcement approach is theoretically possible and more likely to succeed than the arms control approach described above and the Internet governance approach that will follow below, but it falls short in what it delivers for the balancing of states. Although it does not necessarily address the hard powers of states, it deals with the contentious issue of non-state actors that governments have struggled to manage, and, more importantly, builds confidence among states. A final disclaimer would be that the proposed solutions to “double-bad” issues (illegal in both jurisdictions) can be a slippery slope for increasingly intrusive surveillance measures that the Western like-minded states would not condone.

Third and Fourth Basket, Third Committee Issues

The Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly focuses the social, humanitarian and cultural issues. Most notably, human rights are discussed within this committee, and also in other UN institutions, such as the Human Rights Council and UNESCO, as well as outside the UN context: the Council of Europe, EU, OSCE, Freedom Online Coalition (FOC), IGF, WSIS, APC, Human Rights Watch, and many more. The application of international law (including human rights law) has already been established by the United Nations, and a human rights-based approach has been reiterated in many other contexts such as the NETmundial Declaration in 2014. It is, however, unlikely to create a balance of power among states by and of itself as many of the *multilateralist* countries that promote a state-governed Internet through notions such as “cyber sovereignty” remain critical of human

rights. Moreover, human rights law governs mainly the relations between governments and their citizens. Instead, it needs to be incorporated into other approaches.

Finally, there have been several attempts by states to assert power in cyberspace by pushing for a state-led Internet governance approach through the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) of the United Nations. Internet governance is largely treated as a Second Committee issue (primarily through ECOSOC and the Internet Governance Forum) but there are options to connect it to the Third Committee as well. The IGF has no formal decision-making power or government policy-making impact, but instead helps to coordinate and facilitate among the different Internet governance constituencies. If the Third Committee link to Internet governance can be strengthened, this might also reinforce the notion of a rights-based Internet.

The Internet governance regime complex best represents the complexity of dealing with the larger issues of managing resources and behaviors in cyberspace. It encompasses a wide range of different institutions, from established international organizations like the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)⁵⁴ to the critical Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)⁵⁵ that is characterized by its informal structure, and the nonprofit public-benefit corporation known as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).⁵⁶ Most importantly, the Internet governance ecosystem is resolutely representative of the multistakeholder approach, with civil society, the private sector and government stakeholders each working more or less equally according to their strengths. As such, it is a “proof” of the legitimizing principle of cyberspace: nothing that is determined about resources and behaviors in cyberspace can be legitimate if it fully violates the basic reality of how the Internet is actually managed.

As such, a major question of the state’s influence on Internet governance was solved by a momentous decision by the Obama administration. The day of October 1, 2016 marked a historic moment, when the US government officially cut the final strings to its influence over ICANN by handing over the IANA function—the management of the root zone file of the Internet—to ICANN in its entirety.⁵⁷ The process of slowly moving the Internet away from government influence was arguably part of the basic US approach to the Internet since as far back as the 1980s. A number of steps under various administrations conformed to this principle—slowly moving the Internet “back into the Internet community” that gave birth to it, even if that community was heavily financed by the US government in its early years. The commitment of the US government to fully disinvest itself from the last vestiges of direct control over the Internet was given new urgency after the June 2013 Snowden revelations and the significant impact this had on US “soft power,” particularly in and through cyberspace. Although it marks an awkward bent in realist thinking




Figure 7.4 The Cyber Regime Complex by Stakeholder Group: “Internet Governance” Cluster. *Source:* Alexander Klimburg, “To the GGE and beyond,” UNIDIR Cyber Stability Conference Series, 17 July 2016, Geneva. Available at: www.unidir.ch/files/conferences/pdfs/looking-ahead-the-gge-and-beyond-en-1-1173.pdf.

that a state would voluntarily give up power, the Obama administration made the assessment that sticking to previous political commitments and “releasing” the last shreds of government control over the Internet confirmed to three objectives, namely it reinforced the US soft power when it gave up its first “potentially coercive” face of power, to (i) gain a stronger position in the second face, that is, in agenda setting or framing, (ii) it confirmed a self-image of the United States as a leader of a “Free Internet,” and (iii) it finally reinforced the basic legitimizing principle of the Internet altogether: it is run by the multistakeholder approach, and no one government can exercise a hegemonic position on it. Instead, all states enjoy the same relative power. Therefore, the US IANA disinvestment played a significant role in bringing a “balance of power” to the Internet governance domain itself.

The internal balance of power within Internet governance means that it is, in effect, a poor choice for states to advance their power through this approach as it would disrupt the current system and the legitimizing principle. If a state tried to do so at the expense of the multistakeholder model, it would conflict

with the basic reality of the domain, in which the key technical standard setting bodies, such as the IETF, are resolutely outside of governmental control and due to their voluntary nature cannot be co-opted by it. If a state tried to expand its power while at the same time maintaining the multistakeholder model, it would be limited to very small, incremental increases, thus limiting its attractiveness. Restructuring the Internet governance ecosystem to that of an intergovernmental structure is, therefore, a poor choice for states to seek a different balance of power among states as they already enjoy the same relative power under the current ICANN structure that respects the legitimizing principle of the multistakeholder model.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD A BASKET-BASED APPROACH FOR CYBERSPACE

This chapter sets out to assess the application of the balance of power theory to cyberspace to establish international stability and order. It did so by pursuing a more neoliberal interpretation of power. Two conditions of the balance of power theory were applied to three approaches or scenarios that roughly correspond to the first three committees of the United Nations General Assembly, to see how they could contribute to such a stable environment, leading to the following preliminary observations.

Overall, merit can be found in the realist approach to stability and international order in cyberspace by describing it in terms of compromise and of relative security and relative insecurity. By adopting a neoliberal interpretation of the notion of cyber power, the balance of power theory can be applied to certain aspects of cyberspace. Establishing stability in this environment hinges upon the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that it expresses it in a revolutionary foreign policy. At least for now, the Internet governance domain enjoys a balance of power among states in accordance with the legitimizing principle. This principle, described as a “recognition of limits” by the state, is construed by the technical reality of the domain inhibiting one party from deciding universally and unilaterally, arguably defined as the multistakeholder reality in the context of cyberspace.

However, the condition of an equilibrium of forces that lies at the core of the balance of power theory is currently impossible to establish as it requires states to have a basic understanding of each other’s capabilities and, therefore, a minimum amount of agreed definitions as to what constitutes a “cyberweapon.” In this context, compared to the other options, an arms control treaty has most to offer for the balance of power for states in cyberspace. If nearly all difficulties could be overcome, it would clarify those concepts

of capabilities that are in much need of more transparency. This transparency can be delivered in the short term through CBMs, agreements of self-restraint or norms, but those fall short in terms of visibility, verification, and rigor in the long run compared to the former approach.

Each of the other baskets has its own specific merit, but falls short in establishing a balance of power for states in adherence to the legitimizing principle. Instead, a holistic basket-based approach could serve as an alternative. In a thought piece for the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, Wolfgang Kleinwächter describes the need, dilemmas, and possibilities of such an approach.⁵⁸ Using the context of the “Helsinki Process” of the 1970s as a source of inspiration, Kleinwächter identifies four baskets: (1) cybersecurity, (2) digital economy, (3) human rights, and (4) technology. These correspond to the previously discussed baskets with the addition of “technology.” Each basket includes a different constellation of actors and constituencies involved and, therefore, enjoys different levels of multistakeholder and multilateral engagement, as appropriate. Kleinwächter in particular highlights the attraction of the Helsinki Process: namely, that the basket-based approach is the only way to align the vastly different interests of the two per-dominant power blocks and that of the G77, as well as fitting the essential multistakeholder reality that underpins all aspects of cyberspace.

The baskets are not “joined” or organized in a hierarchical fashion. Instead, they are brought together under a decentralized Conference on Security and Cooperation in Cyberspace (CSCC) and connected through a system of liaisons and mechanisms of reciprocal reporting to increase information exchange, cross-fertilization, and eventually, more coherence across these topics. Like its historical precedent, each basket is negotiated individually, but remains interconnected with the others, allowing asymmetric compromises in the negotiation processes—as the British foreign minister argued in 1972, “if we don’t lay eggs in the third basket, there will be none in the other ones either.” Ideally, over time, the actions of states would balance out across all baskets, enabling not only information exchange but also a more concerted level of negotiation between states. The conference would aim at drafting a “Final Act on Security and Cooperation in Cyberspace” (FASCC), legally nonbinding commitments from governments, the private sector, civil society and the technical community.⁵⁹

Fundamentally, the inspiration drawn from the Helsinki Process revolves around the same essential complex “bottom-up” nature of negotiations, its emphasis on “soft law” (none of the Helsinki agreements have treaty status), the strengthening of human rights, and the weak institutional basis (the OSCE was set up only in 1995). Furthermore, through the Helsinki Watch groups and earlier inclusion of nongovernmental organizations, formal involvement and consultation of non-state actors are facilitated. Just like in the 1970s,

when the idea to have a discussion about conventional forces in Europe side-by-side with a human rights discussion, the same “basket-based” approach could be applied to the wide variety of issues in cyberspace: International peace and security issues, cybercrime (terrorist use of the Internet) and economic and development issues, human rights and Internet governance issues. These also nicely align with the UN First to Third Committees.

Most importantly, it needs to be pointed out that the Helsinki Final Act did not create new norms but reinforced existing norms within the UN charter. It provided for an “enhanced explanation” of the Charter, something that could be very welcome in the context of cyberspace. It would also help define the exact role of the multistakeholder model and its application across the baskets. Just like the original Helsinki Process, it does require the full-fledged support of all major powers to get underway—the United States was notably hesitant on the Helsinki Process from the very start, and a new Helsinki Process might be equally popular, for similar reasons. However, the legally nonbinding status here is key—it provides assurances to the doubters that the process can be reversed if necessary, while at the same time does not undermine existing international law.

A basket-based model inspired by the Helsinki Process could create an environment in which all major players can expand their foreign policy interests in the respective baskets, while leaving room for others to do the same, leading to a more stable situation whereby all states are equally (dis)satisfied and at the same time respect the legitimizing principle of a multistakeholder reality in cyberspace. No matter how likely its success, it needs to be seen as a collaborative effort where progress toward stability can be made on several fronts.

The basket-based approach is obviously just one approach that need not frame a “final answer” to the overarching problem of balancing states’ interests in cyberspace. But it may form a beginning.

NOTES

1. U.S. National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23) defines cyberspace as “the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries. Common usage of the term also refers to the virtual environment of information and interactions between people.”

2. Kissinger, Henry. 1969. *Central Issues of American Foreign Policy*. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d4>

3. For an overview of the evolution of the balance of power theory, see Schweller, Rendall L. May 2016. *The Balance of Power in World Politics*. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, USA. For examples of the competing theoretical and empirical claims see Vasquez, J. A. and C. Elman. eds. 2003. *Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate*. Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

4. See, for example, Mearsheimer: “The international system creates powerful incentives for States to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs” (Mearsheimer, John. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton); and Morgenthau: “the aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity, to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it” (Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* [4th ed.], New York: Alfred Knopf).

5. Jervis, Robert. 1978. *Cooperation under the Security Dilemma*, pp. 186–189.

6. Waltz, for example, maintains that “these balances tend to form whether some or all States consciously aim to establish and maintain balance, or whether some or all States aim for universal domination” in Waltz, K. N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. p. 119; and Morgenthau who considers a balance of power as a result from a State’s policies in Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (4th ed.). New York: Alfred Knopf. Statecraft based on balancing policies has been lauded by figures such as Metternich, Castlereagh, Churchill, and Kissinger.

7. Schweller, R. L. 2006. *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: “Balancing means the creation or aggregation of military power through either internal mobilization or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the occupation and domination of the State by a foreign power or coalition. The State balances to prevent the loss of *territory*, either one’s homeland or vital interests abroad (e.g., sea lanes, colonies, or other territory considered of vital strategic interest). Balancing only exists when States target their military hardware at each other in preparation for a possible war.”

8. Kissinger, Henry. 1957. *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace 1812–1822*. Echo Point Books & Media.

9. See Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 2011. “The Future of Power.” *Public Affairs*.

10. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 2010. *Cyber Power*. Harvard University Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, pp. 7–8. Available at: www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/cyber-power.pdf.

11. Kuehl, Daniel T. “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem.” In: Kramer, Franklin D., Stuart Starr, and Larry K. Wentz, eds. 2009. *Cyberpower and National Security*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. Available at: <http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/files/2014/03/Cyberpower-I-Chap-02.pdf>.

12. *Ibid.*, p.10.

13. CNE was initially defined in JP1-02 as “Enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary information systems or networks.” In JP 3-13 (2012), its removal from JP-02 was approved.

14. Cyberspace Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) is defined in JP3-12 (2013) as “consist[ing] of the non-intelligence enabling activities conducted to

plan and prepare for potential follow-on military operations. OPE requires cyberspace forces trained to a standard that prevents compromise of related IC operations. OPE in cyberspace is conducted pursuant to military authorities and must be coordinated and deconflicted with other USG departments and agencies.”

15. Network attacks are usually preceded by network exploitation. As former NSA and CIA director Michael Hayden states in his book, *Playing to the Edge* (2017): “Reconnaissance should come first in the cyber-domain. . . . How else would you know what to hit, how, when—without collateral damage?”

16. Offensive Cyber Effects Operations (OCEO) is defined in PPD-20 as “Operations and related programs or activities—other than network defense, cyber collection, or DCEO—conducted by or on behalf of the United States Government, in or through cyberspace, that are intended to enable or produce cyber effects outside United States Government networks.”

17. See FM3-38 (2014) for examples. Electronic Attacks, for example, is “considered a form of fires” (see 4–3).

18. Exploiting, for instance, the ability to conduct differential power analysis on individual computers.

19. Klimburg, Alexander. 2017. *The Darkening Web: The War for Cyberspace*. New York: Penguin Press.

20. Slayton, Rebecca. 2016. “What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment.” *International Security* 41, no. 3. Slayton argues that this perception leads to unnecessary escalation and militarization of cyberspace. According to Klimburg (2017), using DDoS costs as a point of departure, defense can be conceived as being up to 1,000 times more costly than offense.

21. In *Zero Days, Thousands of Nights* by Lillian Ablon and Timothy Bogart of RAND, the average lifespan of zero-days is set at 6.9 years, and for a given stockpile of zero days, about 5.7 percent will be publicly disclosed after one year. The report is available at: www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1751.html.

22. The EternalBlue exploit is a good example of a weapon or exploit developed by the NSA that was leaked by the Shadow Brokers, and was used in several malware epidemics afterward, including NotPetya and WannaCry. See, for example, Fox-Brewster, Thomas. May 12, 2017. “An NSA Cyber Weapon Might Be Behind A Massive Global Ransomware Outbreak.” *Forbes*. www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/05/12/nsa-exploit-used-by-wannacry-ransomware-in-global-explosion/#2ff505c2e599; and Perlroth, Nicole, and Perloth, Nicole, Mark Scott, Sheera Frenkel. June 27, 2017. “Cyberattack Hits Ukraine Then Spreads Internationally.” *The New York Times*, www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/technology/ransomware-hackers.html?_r=0.

23. Several examples include NotPetya, Turla and Black Energy. These are all malware attacks generally thought to be sponsored by the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, it went rogue and the malware hit Russian organizations and companies as well. More information available at: www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations

24. Kissinger. *A World Restored*.

25. Kissinger, Henry. 1989. *War Roared Into Vacuum Formed by a Sidestepping of Statesmanship*. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-27/opinion/op-1559_1_eastern-europe.

26. Ibid., p. 145.

27. Schweller, Randall. 2016. *The Balance of Power in World Politics*. 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.119.

28. The *legitimizing principle* is not a traditional element of the Balance of Power theory. Although the concept appears in other contexts and modes of thought, Henry Kissinger introduced it as an addition to Balance of Power in order to establish stability—see: Kissinger. *A World Restored*. Similar definitions of the notion are included below:

“*The legitimizing principle represents the prevailing values of the historical epoch. It is in the name of the legitimizing principle that nations accept the international order.*” In Cleva. Gregory D. *Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy*, p. 66.

“By “order” is meant the legitimizing principle by which authority receives its sanction in the eyes of the association. [. . .] It goes to the problem of discovering the operative ideals, the expectations, the rules of concerted action to which the group members believe it necessary to conform in order to give their leaders the necessary authority to realize their own desires and objectives.”

In Leiserson, Avery. 1949. “Problems of Representation in the Government of Private Groups.” *The Journal of Politics* 11, no. 3: 569.

“*The urge for formally declared and generally acknowledged legitimacy approaches the status of a constant feature of political life. This urge requires that power be converted into authority [...]. Politics is not merely a struggle for power but also a contest over legitimacy, a competition in which the conferment or denial, the confirmation or revocation, of legitimacy is an important stake. [. . .] [t]here is, of course, a correlation between the nature of the legitimizing principle and the identity of its applicator. For instance, the principle of divine right tends to call for an ecclesiastical spokesman, and the consent theory implies reliance on a democratic electoral process.*” In Claude, Inis L. Jr. 1966. “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations.” *International Organization* 20, no. 3: 367.

“*Legitimizing principles are called into question during major systemic crises, such as world wars or widespread political upheavals [...]. This dynamic occurs because it is impossible to completely satisfy the statist and nationalist principles simultaneously. Therefore, the new system tends to generate its own crisis, leading to a reevaluation of the normative principle.*” In Barkin, S.J. and B. Cronin. 1994. “The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations.” *International Organization* 48, no. 1: 108.

29. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. May. 2014. “The Regime Complex for Managing Global Cyber Activities.” *Global Commission on the Internet Governance*. Available at: www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_paper_no1.pdf.

30. See, for example, initiatives from Microsoft on the Digital Geneva Convention, the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, the Charter of Trust, the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace and the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC). These efforts were initiated by major tech corporations or civil society actors in cooperation with each other and/or states. They have stepped into the norm-setting arena largely because of a sense of societal responsibility, with a view to fill the void created by the influential states.

31. For instance, the Brundtland Commission created norms for Sustainable Development. A Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict led to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and a commitment by all UN member states on the duty to prevent and protect against war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity. The Ilves Commission helped set the framework for the NETmundial Initiative. The Brandt and Palme Commissions represented important steps both in development and disarmament, respectively.

32. The Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace (2018) is a high-level multistakeholder declaration with norms and principles to enhance cybersecurity that is signed by 552 official supporters from all stakeholder groups and launched by French President Emmanuel Macron. For more information see: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France. 2018. *The Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace* https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/paris_call_text_-_en_cle06f918.pdf.

33. The UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation, a multistakeholder initiative dealing with a variety of digital challenges, argue in favor of a distributed co-governance architecture that bridges multilateralism and multistakeholderism. UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. 2019. *The Age of Digital Interdependence*. 33, <https://digitalcooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/DigitalCooperation-report-web-FINAL-1.pdf>.

34. United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/73/27. 2018. <https://undocs.org/A/RES/73/27>

35. UNGGE 2015 Report, paragraph 31 on p. 13, available at: www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/174.

36. For a comprehensive overview of cyber diplomatic initiatives see: Grigsby, Alex. 2017. *Overview of Cyber Diplomatic Initiatives*, and Housen-Couriel, Deborah. 2017. *An Analytical Review and Comparison of Operative Measures Included in Cyber Diplomatic Initiatives*, both published as Briefings from the Research Advisory Group for the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, available at: <https://cyberstability.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/GCSC-Briefings-from-the-Research-Advisory-Group-New-Delhi-2017.pdf>.

37. The UN General Assembly, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/65/201. July 30, 2010, available at: www.unidir.org/files/medias/pdfs/final-report-eng-0-189.pdf.

38. The UN General Assembly, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/68/98. June 24, 2013, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/98.

39. The United States argues it failed over states' unwillingness to explain how specific bodies of international law, such as the law of armed conflict (LOAC) or state responsibility, apply to cyberspace. Cuba, echoing the views of Russia and China, argues that acknowledging LOAC would legitimize cyberspace as a domain for military conflict, giving state-sponsored cyber operations a green light.

Sources: Markoff, Michele G. *Explanation of Position at the Conclusion of the 2016–2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the*

Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, available at: www.state.gov/s/cyberissues/releasesandremarks/272175.htm. “71 UNGA: Cuba at the final session of Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security,” Cuba’s Representative Office Abroad, available at: <http://misiones.minrex.gob.cu/en/un/statements/71-unga-cuba-final-session-group-governmental-experts-developments-field-information>.

For a non-State expert commentary of the failure of the 2016–2017 GGE, see, for example: Lewis, James A. August 6, 2017. The Devil Was in the Details: The Failure of UN Efforts in Cyberspace, available at: www.thecipherbrief.com/devil-was-details-failure-un-efforts-cyberspace-1092.

40. The UN General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 22 December 2018 Advancing responsible State behavior in cyberspace in the context of international security, (A/RES/73/266) January 2, 2019, available at: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/266>.

41. The UN General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December 2018 Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, (A/RES/73/27) December 11, 2018, available at: <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/27>.

42. The UN General Assembly, Letter dated January 9, 2015, from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, (A/69/723) January 13, 2015, available at: <https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-150113-CodeOfConduct.pdf>.

43. The UN General Assembly, Letter dated September 12, 2011, from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, A/66/359 (September 14, 2011), available at: www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A%2F66%2F359&Submit=Search&Lang=E; Grigsby, Alex. January 28, 2015. “Will China and Russia’s Updated Code of Conduct Get More Traction in a Post-Snowden Era?” *Net Politics* (blog), the Council on Foreign Relations, available at: www.cfr.org/blog/will-china-and-russias-updated-code-conduct-get-more-traction-post-snowden-era; McKune, Sarah. September 28, 2015. “An Analysis of the International Code for Conduct for Information Security,” *The Citizen Lab*, available at: <https://citizenlab.ca/2015/09/international-code-of-conduct/>.

44. The UN General Assembly, Resolution 57/239. January 31, 2013. Creation of a global culture of cybersecurity, A/RES/47/239, available at: www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/UN-security-resolution.pdf.

45. The Wassenaar Arrangement was criticized as lacking in technical expertise—partially because governments had no prior history of engaging with issues related to cybersecurity. For similar point see: Goodwin and Fletcher. *Export Controls and Cybersecurity Tools*.

46. More information available at: www.wassenaar.org/about-us/.

47. More information available at: www.wassenaar.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/WA-Plenary-Public-Statement-2013.pdf.

48. Grigsby, Alex. 2017. "The End of Cyber Norms", *Survival*, 59(6).
49. Morgus, Robert, Max Smeets, Trey Herr. 2017. *Countering the Proliferation of Offensive Cyber Capabilities*. Published by the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, and available at: https://cyberstability.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/GCSC-Briefings-from-the-Research-Advisory-Group_New-Delhi-2017.pdf.
50. The second edition of the *Tallinn Manual* states that, in the opinion of its experts, data is not an object in legal terms (*Tallinn Manual* at p. 127). This view is, however, disputed by other scholars. See for example: Adams, Michael J. January 04, 2017. "A Warning About Tallinn 2.0 ... Whatever It Says." *Lawfare*, available at: www.lawfareblog.com/warning-about-tallinn-20-%E2%80%A6-whatever-it-says.
51. For more information on the feasibility of the application of the counter-proliferation model to cyberspace see: Morgus, Robert, Max Smeets, Trey Herr. 2017. *Countering the Proliferation of Offensive Cyber Capabilities*. Published by the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, and available at: https://cyberstability.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/GCSC-Briefings-from-the-Research-Advisory-Group_New-Delhi-2017.pdf. For more information on the application of the feasibility of a Cyber Weapons Convention based off the Chemical Weapons Convention, see Geers, Kenneth. September 2010. "Cyber Weapons Convention." *Computer Law & Security Review*, Volume 26, Issue 5, pp. 547–551.
52. Council of Europe. 2001. *Convention on Cybercrime*. European Treaty Series—No. 185, available at: www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680081561.
53. "Russia Presents Draft UN Convention on Fighting Cyber Crimes in Vienna." *Sputnik*, May 25, 2017, <https://sputniknews.com/science/201705251053959333-russia-un-convention-cybercrimes/>.
54. The ITU is a United Nations agency established in 1865, whose mission includes developing technical standards, allocating the radio spectrum, and providing technical assistance and capacity building to developing countries.
55. The IETF is one of the most important organizations working on Internet protocols and effectively decides much what constitutes the Internet's nervous system; most protocols, such as DNS and BGP. Its mission is to "make the Internet work better" from an engineering point of view. They try to avoid policy and business questions as much as possible, which are mostly managed by the Internet Society.
56. ICANN is a nonprofit public-benefit corporation with the purpose to coordinate at the overall level, the global Internet system of unique identifiers and manage the Internet names and addresses (IANA function) www.icann.org/resources/pages/what-2012-02-25-en,
57. On 1 October 2016, the contract between ICANN and the United States Department of Commerce National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to perform the IANA functions officially expired, handing over the stewardship of IANA functions to the global Internet community. You can read the announcement here: www.icann.org/news/announcement-2016-10-01-en.
58. Kleinwächter, Wolfgang. 2018. *Towards a Holistic approach for Internet Related Public Policy Making: Can the Helsinki Process of the 1970s Be a Source of Inspiration to Enhance Stability in Cyberspace?* Published by the Global Commission

on the Stability of Cyberspace, available at: https://cyberstability.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GCSC_Kleinwachter-Thought-Piece-2018-1.pdf.

59. A priori, it is interesting to note that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was very much a European product, in particular a German one, that the United States only grudgingly supported. Therefore, the context for the Helsinki Process is arguably more complex than a bipolar negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was primarily interested in gaining recognition and legitimacy of their sphere of influence. Western interests, while not fully homogenous, can be summarized in pushing forward the military security and humanitarian issues, such as the free flow of individuals, information and ideas between East and West. At least as important, there was the work of the Helsinki Watch groups—the formally protected NGOs that in particular monitored human rights abuses in Eastern Europe. The Helsinki Final Act fundamentally led to NGOs being institutionalized in the East.

Governing Cyberspace

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