

Appendix 2 to chapter 6

Benchmarking Pachakutik's performance with Izquierda Democrática's performance.

Izquierda Democrática

Rodrigo Borja Cevallos created Izquierda Democrática (ID) after he left the *Partido Liberal* in 1968. The party was officially registered in 1978 and became one of the few political parties that participated in the country's first elections after returning to democracy in 1979. ID was envisioned as a “modern” political party that would “change the way politics took place in Ecuador” (Freidenberg & Alcántara Sáez, 2001, p. 131).¹ The party's foundational charter established its aims as to “end corruption, populism, and caudillismo, as well as the exploitation and oppression of the population with the formation of a new state based on the participation of the Ecuadorian population” (as cited in Freidenberg & Alcántara Sáez, 2001, p. 131). The party's motto, “social justice with freedom” (*Justicia social con libertad*), meant that the party offered “economic change, social justice, and structural change but without suppressing human rights” (ID-1, 2018). ID can be defined as a social democratic party, which – in the grand scheme of things – makes the party one of the few party organizations with which Pachakutik has policy preferences in common. Therefore, ID works well as a peer organization to benchmark Pachakutik's performance. Additionally, ID maintained an active presence at the Ecuadorian electoral arena from 1979 until 2013, which allows me to trace an almost full longitudinal comparison between the two parties for the whole period of evaluation.²

1.1 ID's primary goals and performance between 1996 and 2006

1.1.1 ID's primary goals in 1996, 1998, and 2002.

ID had as its primary goal the protection of the organization, i.e., value infusion, in 1996 and 1998. Table 1.1 summarizes my findings relating to value-infusion-seeking parties' indicators for ID's campaigns of 1996 and 1998. The 1996 electoral campaign was difficult to analyze because ID did not present a presidential candidate. The party did not hold primary elections

¹ There is little clarity as to what this meant exactly. Nevertheless, what is clear is that the party aimed to oppose the regime of José María Velasco Ibarra and presented itself as opposing the clientelistic and populist practices of President Velasco Ibarra.

² The party was de-registered in 2013 and re-registered in 2016.

to select a possible presidential candidate for the 1996 election. Instead, after an internal struggle that resulted in party-members leaving the party and the old-time party leader, Rodrigo Borja, taking over the organization's control (despite announcing in 1992 he would step away from politics), the party announced its support for Freddy Ehlers.³ Party members received this decision with lukewarm enthusiasm. At the time, the provincial leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with leaders like Borja and Andrés Vallejo, arguing the party was only a place where they got their way (El Comercio, 1995a, 1995b). Other party members reacted more harshly and even left the party to join other presidential campaigns.⁴ Nevertheless, as a former member of ID explained, supporting Ehlers was necessary for the party; Ehlers was the best possible candidate for 1996 as the party could not “*not have*” a presidential candidate (ID-6, 2018). In a way, the decision prompted a division within the party members: those who supported the party leader stayed while others left.

The party's choice in 1996 goes *prima facie* against what is expected of a value-infusion-seeking party; an external candidate was brought in who was not part of the party or represented the party's brand. Yet, this was a choice made by the party's leaders (and founders) to steer their organization away from an alliance with another party that had been in the works. The party's founding leader Rodrigo Borja asserted the decision was made to ensure the party remained a solid organization as many members had left because of the alliance with the other party (El Comercio, 1996a). Although my research showed the opposite – party members left *because* of the agreement to support Pachakutik's candidate, other ID members were satisfied with the choice. Moreover, as a former member of the party explained, Pachakutik's candidate was a “very close friend of the party” (ID-6, 2018). Although this choice of candidate could appear as initially going against the party's goal of value-infusion, it worked oppositely. It

³ In July 1995 the party held a National Convention and decided to support the candidate of the party *Acción Popular Revolucionaria Ecuatoriana* (APRE). The decision was made with the support of the party's president Jorge Gallardo and of 18 out of 21 provincial branch leaders. The decision however was opposed by the long-time leaders of ID Rodrigo Borja, Andrés Vallejo, and Raúl Baca Carbo. The long-time leaders argued that this was an off-brand choice (one of the characteristics of Izquierda Democrática up until 1996 was that the party had not joined any electoral coalition) and that it would negatively impact the programmatic principles of the party as Vargas was not a congenial ally. The provincial leaders by contrast considered Vargas as the candidate with the best options to win the presidency and had actively expressed their unhappiness with the old-leadership who “did not work with them” (my translation, El Comercio, 1995b). Instead of accepting the decision of the provincial leaders, ID's old-time leaders pushed back. The reactions were mixed. Some of those old-time leaders left the party. Over 150 party members disaffiliated from ID after the announcement of the alliance (El Comercio, 1995c, 1995d). The remaining old-time leaders took over the control of the party by February 1996 at a National Executive Council meeting. At the meeting, Rodrigo Borja took over the control of the party (although officially Luis Emilio Jarrín became the party's president) and the end of the alliance with APRE was announced.

⁴ For example Jorge Gallardo joined the party *Acción Popular Revolucionaria Ecuatoriana* (APRE) and became its vice-presidential candidate (El Comercio, 1996b), and other members joined Rodrigo Paz's presidential campaign (El Comercio, 1996c).

triggered the disaffiliation of some members but also the unity within the party organization. Importantly, keeping the party united and supporting its leaders was the main reason for supporting Ehlers. In 1998 ID's choice of candidate returned to the usual suspect, the party's long-time leader Rodrigo Borja who was presented as the party's natural choice. This goes in line with what is expected of value-infusion-seeking parties.

Table 1. 1 Electoral campaign indicators for ID a as value-infusion-seeking party

Electoral campaign indicators for ID as a value-infusion-seeking party in 1996 and 1998			
	Value-infusion-seeking	Izquierda Democrática 1996	Izquierda Democrática 1998
Campaign content	Symbolic (party brand oriented)	Symbolic (party brand oriented)	Symbolic (party brand and candidate oriented)
Historical content	Similar symbolic / party brand content throughout the years	Similar symbolic / party brand content throughout the years	Similar symbolic / party brand content throughout the years
Candidates	Party member candidates	Party member candidates (except for the presidential candidate)	Party member candidates
Alliances	Unlikely	With Pachakutik	No alliances
Campaign leaders	Party members	Party members	Party members
Campaign strategies	Conventional: party brand-oriented	Conventional: party brand-oriented	Conventional: party brand-oriented

At the legislative elections, the party's candidates were all party members who had climbed through the party's ranks. In 1998, the party nominated two former military men: René Yandún and Paco Moncayo, who could be seen as "crowd-pleaser" candidates with no connection to the party. These two men had been in active military duty until the early 1990s and thus had no direct relationship with the party. However, as an ID member explained, they built a relationship with the party since then and fit within the party's ideals (ID-2, 2018).⁵ Overall, ID's candidates in 1996 and 1998 were – with only a few exceptions – party members.

The choice of candidates and the party leaders' intervention against an electoral alliance in 1996 highlights that the party always shunned away from electoral alliances. Although many new and old parties saw electoral alliances as the perfect way to ramp up their votes, ID stayed away from them. Even in 1996, when the party supported Pachakutik's candidate at the

⁵ Both candidates continued to participate in elections with ID after this first election. In fact, in 2017 Paco Moncayo was ID's presidential candidate (backed up also by Pachakutik) and René Yandún was elected legislator for the province Carchi.

presidential elections, they made it clear they would present their own candidates at the legislative elections.

The content of ID's campaigns in 1996 and 1998 focused on the party's slogan "*Justicia social con libertad*" and the party's colors. "We would make sure that to every city we would go, there were orange flags everywhere" (ID-1, 2018). The party also stressed programmatic content, the party members explained. ID ran policy formation workshops and debates to help candidates understand and develop the party's agenda. Moreover, the party had a stable training program for leaders and policy discussion forums that met three times a week (ID-1, 2018). However, none of my interviewees could recall any policy proposal ID advanced, and they would all return to the party's slogan often. The party's programmatic platform often took a back seat. Party members and the candidates moreover managed these campaigns. They used conventional forms of campaigning, often organizing rallies in different cities. As many of my interviewees stressed, the party's candidates would drive across the country with their flags to meet the voters in person (ID-1, ID-2, ID-6, 2018).

Overall, ID's choices during the electoral campaigns of 1996 and 1998 show the party was a value-infusion-seeking party. The party's members were actively interested in preserving the party's organization's integrity and ensuring its persistence. Although the party lost many members in 1996, the party kept those members committed to the already existing brand and the party's long-time leaders. ID has often been described as a programmatic party, i.e., a policy-seeking party (Freidenberg & Alcántara Sáez, 2001). However, my analysis shows that the party was more focused on maintaining the organization's integrity than on advancing any set of policies. Despite the party members' efforts to connect to the electorate via face-to-face campaigning, their actions were mostly focused on building up the party's brand and organization. The party leaders were proud of their organization and worked to protect it (ID-1, ID-2, ID-6, 2018)

ID continued to be a value-infusion-seeking party during the 2002 and 2006 period. The party continued to focus on protecting the integrity of the organization and its cohesion. ID started the campaign rejecting different electoral alliances. One of these was the possible alliance with Pachakutik that ended before it began with Pachakutik's members claiming that ID was only interested in doing things on their own terms and was only willing to appoint their own candidates (El Comercio, 2002a). ID also rejected joining Leon Roldós' offer to create an electoral alliance (ID-2, 2018). ID presented candidates that had gone through the process of joining the party and scaled through the ranks. ID's presidential candidate was, again, Rodrigo

Borja. Alongside, numerous of the party’s well-known leaders became legislative candidates.⁶ Table 1.2 summarizes my findings relating to value-infusion-seeking parties’ indicators for ID’s

Table 1.2 Electoral campaign indicators for ID a as value-infusion-seeking party

Electoral campaign indicators for ID as a value-infusion-seeking party in 2002		
	Value-infusion-seeking	Izquierda Democrática 2002
Campaign content	Symbolic (party brand oriented)	Symbolic (party brand oriented)
Historical content	Similar symbolic / party brand content throughout the years	Similar symbolic / party brand content throughout the years. Focus on Rodrigo Borja.
Candidates	Party member candidates	Party member candidates
Alliances	Unlikely	No alliance (refused to support León Roldós)
Campaign leaders	Party members	Party members
Campaign strategies	Conventional: party brand-oriented	Conventional: party brand-oriented

Borja’s and the legislators’ campaigns followed the usual practices of the party. They focused their time and attention on the presidential candidate, the party’s slogan, and its colors. The party leaders such as Wilfrido Lucero and Andres Vallejo explained there was no other possible candidate for the party. From their perspective, while the party could have presented alternative names, none would be as good as Borja. “He [Borja] is irreplaceable” (Wilfrido Lucero as cited in El Comercio, 2002b). Party members, who had “a lot of experience” and knew how to prepare a campaign, were in charge (ID-2, 2018). To a certain extent, ID’s 2002 campaign was an almost exact copy of the 1998 campaign. ID continued to work on structuring the party organization internally. Overall, ID continued to be a value-infusion-seeking party during this period.

1.1.2 Pachakutik and ID’s performance between 1996 and 2002.

I use ID’s performance to benchmark Pachakutik’s performance in these two periods. Although ID was a long-standing party, which would mean that its performance in 1996-1998 could be evaluated considering its 1992-1996 performance, I focus only on the two periods in which

⁶ Andres Vallejo, Magdalena Chauvet, Alfredo Veras, Wilfrido Lucero, Oswaldo Molestina, and Ramiro González. The latter was heavily tipped as a future leader of the party that could take over once Borja was no longer there.

Pachakutik was evaluated. ID surpassed its aspiration level regarding its value-infusion goal or the period of 1998-2002 and was better able to navigate the Ecuadorian legislative politics than Pachakutik. Compared to ID's performance, Pachakutik performed under the social (peer organization) aspiration level.

The 1996 – 1998 period

ID struggled to maintain organizational unity between 1996 and 1998. Overall, by the end of the period in 1998, the party retained its unity, but this had a cost. In particular, this was the loss of one of ID's well-known leaders Raul Baca Carbo. This happened when Fabián Alarcon became president and announced his new cabinet, which included Raúl Baca Carbo's appointment as Minister of Energy and Mining (which, according to the newspaper *El Comercio* (1997h) included the appointment of over 30 ID's members within the same ministry).⁷ The appointment prompted a meeting of ID's core members. ID had always avoided political appointments, and thus "the issue needed to be discussed" (ID-2, 2018). The meeting's outcome was that the party members considered Baca Carbo should not take the appointment (ID-2, 2018).

Nevertheless, Baca Carbo took the appointment, and the party leader, Rodrigo Borja, went to the media to clarify this was not done in the name of the party (*El Comercio*, 1997g). As the minister's decisions started affecting the Ecuadorian population (rises in electricity prices), Borja called again for Baca Carbo's resignation. The party agreed to discuss the issue at its XVIII National Assembly. In the meeting, Borja was appointed President of ID once more (months prior, the party's charter had been amended to allow this re-election). After his new appointment, he again expressed dissatisfaction with ID's minister (*El Comercio*, 1997e). Baca Carbo (and most of his supporters) ended up disaffiliating from ID in August 1997 (*El Comercio*, 1997j). As it had happened during the months prior to the electoral campaign in 1996, when party members diverged from ID's prominent party leaders' guidelines, the latter would intervene to ensure that the party reflected their principles. This often resulted in party disaffiliations. Nevertheless, these disaffiliations were a cost the party organization was prepared to face if it meant the unity of those that remained would be reinforced.

⁷ In addition *El Comercio* (1997k) reported an interview with Luis Jarrín who asserted the appointed Minister of Agriculture, Alfredo Saltos was part of a quota he had agreed with Alarcon.

Table 1. 3 Comparison of Pachakutik and ID's performance (1996-1998)

Comparison of Pachakutik and ID's performance (1996-1998)		
	Pachakutik (1996-1998)	ID (1996-1998)
Policy advancement		
Proposals presented	30 (4%)	29 (3.86%)
Discussed in the first debate	8 (2.08%)	17 (5.94%)
Discussed in the second debate	7 (20.8)	16 (6.45%)
Approved	6 (3.08%)	12 (6.15%)
Most important accomplishment	Ratification of the ILO No. 169 Convention	
Alternative primary goal		Party unity with formalized decision-making procedures.

* The percentages are calculated based on the total number of proposals presented, discussed, and approved.

At the legislature, ID performed better than Pachakutik during the 1996-1998 period (see table 1.3). Although ID presented fewer bill initiatives than Pachakutik, ID's proposals were overall more successful (ID presented 29 while Pachakutik presented 30). Out of the bill initiatives' total number, 17 made it to the first debate, 16 to the second, and 12 proposals were approved and turned into legislation. In turn, Pachakutik only had six bill initiatives turned into laws. ID was better able to bring its bill initiatives from beginning to end. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that given Pachakutik's status as an ethnic party, the party's proposals were arguably more difficult to introduce than ID's proposals. Overall, policy content differences aside, Pachakutik performed under its peer organizations' level during its first period at the legislature.

The 1998 – 2002 period

The 1998 to 2002 period started for ID with Rodrigo Borja's defeat but an overall improvement in terms of seats at the legislature for the party (17 seats including alliances and 11 seats without alliances). During this period, Rodrigo Borja gained even more notoriety as party leader, and the rest of the party fell behind his lead. There was a constant communication line between Rodrigo Borja and the executive that moved the attention from the party's elected officials to the party leader. For example, despite ID having a well-known block leader (Paco Moncayo), in August 1999, Borja met President Mahuad. Both agreed on creating two working groups with the executive and ID members to discuss solutions to the country's economic crisis. Borja asserted he presented Mahuad with proposals to improve tax collection, reduce the effects of

external debt payments on the national internal economy, and suggested changes in oil revenues management (El Comercio, 1999f). ID had as much attention from the executive as, for instance, the indigenous movement. The difference between these two organizations was that the indigenous movement represented the indigenous population, while ID was a party that had no grassroots organizations support. As an expert asserted, “it can hardly be said that ID represented a particular sector of the population. Perhaps, Quito’s upper middle class?” (EXP-2, 2018).

At the legislature, ID participated as ‘democratic opposition’ (Rodrigo Borja as cited in El Comercio, 1999b). ID focused on either championing or opposing different candidates for the appointments of Central Bank, State’s Attorney, and others. One of the most reported ID actions was its opposition to Ignacio Vidal Maspons as the attorney general candidate. (El Comercio, 1999a). Similarly, another well-recorded action of ID was its support for Marco Morales to the Constitutional Court in 1999.⁸ Additionally, ID was always interested in keeping seats at the provincial electoral tribunals. “It is the only way to avoid fraud” (ID-2, 2018). In 1998 the party had secured 21 seats (one seat in every province). In January 2001, the party renegotiated its number of seats and got 26. (El Comercio, 2001). ID moreover sponsored 209 bill initiatives during the 1998-2002 period, of which 79 were debated in the first debate of the plenary, and 62 made it to the second debate. Out of these, in total, 45 became laws. These 45 represent 24.5% of the total output of the legislature. They also represent 22% of all proposals sponsored by ID.

Overall, ID performed better in the 1998-2002 period than it did during the previous period. In short, this party achieved its primary goal of infusing value to the organization. During the 1998-2002 period, ID stopped struggling with members that would not follow the party’s directives. The organization increased in value for its party members as it allowed them to participate in state matters despite not being in government or forming a governing coalition. Moreover, ID performed better in terms of policy output in the 1998-2002 period than in the previous period. The party contributed with almost one-fourth of the overall output of the legislature.

ID’s performance nuances Pachakutik’s goal achievement during this same period. Pachakutik barely surpassed its reference point of performance during the 1998-2002 period. The party struggled to voice the interests of those it represented at the legislature, which

⁸ Morales was a well-known party activist and married to Wilma Andrade who was elected in 1996 with an ID ticket to the Municipal Council of Quito (El Comercio, 1999d). Since 2016 Wilma Andrade is ID’s president.

highlights the party's limitations. In turn, ID got an open door with the executive and secured access to deliver the party members' views and even contributed in larger numbers to the legislature's output. Although both parties were successful at achieving their goals by the end of the 1998-2002 period, ID performed consistently above Pachakutik in terms of policy advancement (see table 1.5).

Nonetheless, it is essential to emphasize the arguably different nature of the proposals that ID sponsored and the ones Pachakutik presented, which likely made the ones from ID move more swiftly at the legislature. Again, setting aside the differences in the bill initiatives' content, overall, it is possible to see how both parties' persistence into the next period was almost evident. Nonetheless, the fact that Pachakutik only surpassed its aspiration level with a minimum increase and at the same time performed well under its peer organization performance level could likely signal the party would, moving into the next period, re-evaluate its goals or develop a new way to achieve its primary goal.

Table 1. 4 Comparison of Pachakutik and ID's performance (1998-2002)

Pachakutik's and ID's performance compared (1998-2002)		
	Pachakutik (1998-2002)	ID (1998-2002)
Policy advancement		
Proposals presented	58 (6.1%)	209 (21.84%)
Discussed in the first debate	16 (4.94%)	79 (24.34%)
Discussed in the second debate	15 (5.81%)	62 (24.03%)
Approved	10 (5.43%)	45 (24.46%)
Most important accomplishment	Approval of the Ley de Juntas Parroquiales	
Extras	Pachakutik's legislators held the vice-presidency of Congress for the whole period.	ID leader had a direct relationship with the executive. Party unity with formalized decision-making procedures.
Alternative goal		

** The percentages are calculated based on the total number of proposals presented, discussed, and approved.*

The 2002 – 2006 period

The 2002-2006 period marks the beginning of the abandonment of traditional parties by the Ecuadorian electorate. As discussed in chapter 3, this mostly happened at the presidential level

in that election. At the legislature, traditional parties retained most of their seats. This was the case for ID. Rodrigo Borja lost his second presidential race in a row, but at the legislature, ID received 16 seats (one less than in 1998). ID arrived in this period still as a value-infusion-seeking party and failed to surpass its aspiration level during this period. The party faced such a level of internal shocks that its primary goal was changed during the period.

After his electoral defeat, Rodrigo Borja stepped down. The electoral results triggered criticisms from party members about Borja's obstinateness with being the sole candidate of ID and holding on to the party's directorship for more than five years (Efrén Cocíos in *El Comercio*, 2002a). This created the opportunity for other party members to rise into a leadership position and guide the party away from Borja's preferred performance. Unlike what happened in 1996 when the party members rallied behind Borja and the other long-time leaders, after the 2002 elections, several "newer" party members started to challenge the old-timers. This started a process of change that was intensified when Rodrigo Borja was replaced as president of the party by Guillermo Landazuri in 2004.

The change in leadership in 2004 was accompanied by a sharp turn in the party's primary goal. ID started working towards holding offices, which included deploying strategies to increase the electoral support for the party's candidates. This was evident at the 2004 local elections when ID reached an agreement with PSC (ID's one-time biggest opponent) for the latter not to present candidates in Pichincha and Quito for the 2004 local elections. With this, ID ensured that one of the largest forces of the right would not compete with its candidates against the votes in Quito (*El Comercio*, 2004). The plan was successful, and ID's candidate, Paco Moncayo, was re-elected. Additionally, after Lucio Gutiérrez was ousted, and for the first time since 1988, ID officials took government appointments representing the party. Oswaldo Molestina was appointed Minister of Foreign Trade (*El Comercio*, 2005b), and Raul Vallejo was appointed as Minister of Education (*El Comercio*, 2006a).⁹

These changes, especially the political appointments, were challenged by party members such as Dalton Bacigalupo, a long-time party member, who asserted Izquierda Democrática was suffering from a lack of leadership (*El Comercio*, 2006a). The changes in ID's primary goal thus triggered several disaffiliations that resembled what happened in 1996. However, this time, those who left the party did so because the new leadership moved the party away from its long-held goal (*El Comercio*, 2006c). Moreover, those who stayed did not rally

⁹ Oddly, ID's leader Guillermo Landazuri criticized this appointment and requested Vallejo resigned or disaffiliated ID. Vallejo replied Landazuri had not had this attitude with Oswaldo Molestina's appointment and kept both his appointment and his affiliations with ID. (*El Comercio*, 2006a).

behind the new leader. The internal schisms continued, which ended up meaning numerous disaffiliations

ID's performance at the legislature was better than it had been during the 1998-2002 period. First, ID started the Congressional period with the usual announcement about its intention to join the opposition (El Comercio, 2002b). At the same time, ID secured Guillermo Landazuri's appointment as first vice-president of the 2002-2005 National Congress, which meant he effectively became the president of Congress given the absence of an appointed president.¹⁰ ID leveraged this appointment to distribute the legislative committees' presidencies amongst its legislators and the legislators elected with PSC and DP. (El Comercio, 2003a).

Additionally, ID worked to get its preferred candidates to the Constitutional Court and the Electoral Tribunals.¹¹ Overall, the number of appointments accomplished by the party leadership at the Electoral Tribunals during this period vastly surpassed ID's appointments from the previous evaluation period (29 compared to 21 in 1998-2002). After Lucio Gutiérrez was ousted, Wilfrido Lucero became the legislature's president, thus giving ID full control of Congress for the remaining period of the legislature (2005-2006).

In terms of policy advancement, ID did not surpass its aspiration level based on the previous period (see table 1.5). The party presented in total 217 proposals equivalent to 16.53% of the overall number of proposals submitted at the legislature during this period. Of these, 67 were discussed at the first debate, 45 were addressed in the second debate, and in total, 29 were approved, which represents 17.79% of the legislature's total output. As table 1.5 shows, during the previous period (1998-2002), ID performed better. The party had more proposals discussed in the first debate, the second, and approved during the 1998-2002 period.

All in all, Izquierda Democrática ended this period changed, with new leadership and seemingly with a new primary goal. In terms of the goal the party pursued going into the beginning of the period, the party did not surpass its aspiration level. Instead, the party showed

¹⁰ PSC was supposed to take the presidency of Congress (the party had the majority in Congress with 26 legislators) but decided not to present any candidate. This constituted a blow for Pachakutik and Lucio Gutiérrez' party. They claimed they had a total of 19 deputies, thus making them into the second largest majority in Congress which would entitle them to hold the presidency. PSC however blocked this. By contrast ID had 16 legislators. However, it was argued that ID was effectively larger as 13 deputies were elected under an ID ticket, while PSP and Pachakutik had legislators elected under double tickets and single tickets. Therefore, ID was given the slot of the first vice-presidency.

¹¹ This was one of the usual issues that ID legislators would engage with as discussed in the section about the 1998-2002 period. Enrique Herrería was appointed to the Constitutional Tribunal, and Jorge Valdospinos to the Electoral Tribunal. Both were ID's candidates. (El Comercio, 2003b). The TSE local (provincial) offices also allocated 29 representatives of ID.

significant internal fractures with several disaffiliations. By the end of the period, the solidity of the party organization was in peril. However, the party performed noticeably better in terms of holding office and having influence at the legislature. Nevertheless, in terms of policy advancement, the party performed worse than it did during the 1998-2002 period. Overall, it is difficult to ascertain whether ID had a period of failure or achievement because of the changes in priorities of the party and the new leadership's ability to achieve the new goal of holding office. Strictly speaking, ID failed to achieve its goals of value-infusion but succeeded in holding office.

Table 1. 5 ID's performance (2002-2006)

ID's performances in 1998-2002 and 2002-2006 compared		
	ID (1998-2002)	ID (2002-2006)
Policy advancement		
Proposals presented	209 (21.84%)	217 (16.53%)
Discussed in the first debate	79 (24.34%)	67 (17.91%)
Discussed in the second debate	62 (24.03%)	45 (18%)
Approved	45 (24.46%)	29 (17.79%)
Extras	ID leader had a direct relationship with the executive. Party unity with formalized decision-making procedures.	ID legislators became vice-president of Congress (acting president) for the 2002-2005 period. A second ID legislator became president of the legislature for the remaining period.
Value-infusion		Internal problems, and numerous disaffiliations.
Holding Office	No appointments	Two cabinet appointments.

** The percentages are calculated based on the total number of proposals presented, discussed, and approved.*

Despite ID's internal problems, this party performed better than Pachakutik overall during this period (2002-2006). As discussed, Pachakutik's bet to hold office did not work. Table 1.6 summarizes Pachakutik's and ID's performance, which clarifies that Pachakutik performed, again, under the peer organizations' aspiration levels. In terms of policy, ID had more proposals discussed and approved than Pachakutik. Moreover, even when ID did not start the period aiming to hold office, the party performed better than Pachakutik in this goal. It moreover held onto the cabinet's appointments for a more extended period.

Overall, Pachakutik performed once again under the average of its peer organizations. This was the first time Pachakutik, besides performing worse than its peers, also did not surpass

its aspiration levels. This triggered a process of disaffiliation from Pachakutik. Since 2004 and well into 2006, several Pachakutik's members left the party; these members were mostly the party members linked to mestizo organizations and the mestizo leadership, but there were also indigenous members. The disaffiliations were explained as caused by the transformation of Pachakutik into an ethnic-centered party (Madrid, 2012, p. 103). However, I showed in chapter 5 that Pachakutik's mobilization strategies hardly resemble an ethnocentric party. The accounts of disaffiliations often highlighted that the party's leaders had adopted a position against joining further electoral alliances and to, in the future, only employ the party's candidates. This position was adopted partially due to the failed alliance with PSP. Thus, it could be argued that Pachakutik's leadership change of position was not a move toward an ethnocentric party. Still, it moved away from electoral strategies that privileged holding-office (and getting electoral support) over the party's policies and organization's survival.

Table 1. 6 Comparison of Pachakutik and ID's performance (2002-2006)

Comparison of Pachakutik and ID's performance (2002-2006)		
	Pachakutik (2002-2006)	ID (2002-2006)
Policy advancement		
Proposals presented	66 (5.03%)	217 (16.53%)
Discussed in the first debate	15 (4.01%)	67 (17.91%)
Discussed in the second debate	11 (4.40%)	45 (18%)
Approved	9 (5.03%)	29 (17.79%)
Holding office	11% of the key administrative positions in the executive were rescinded by mid-2003. CODENPE's executive secretary.	Two cabinet appointments. ID legislators became vice-president of Congress (acting president) for the 2002-2005 period. A second ID legislator became president of the legislature for the remaining period
Extras		

** The percentages are calculated based on the total number of proposals presented, discussed, and approved.*

In any case, by the end of the 2002-2006 period, Pachakutik was plagued with disaffiliations, and the party's cohesion was in peril as the party leaders scrambled to unify the organization again (Mijeski & Beck, 2011, p. 103).¹² ID finished the period also plagued by disaffiliations but having achieved the goal that the new party leadership had decided on: holding office. Overall, the end of this period highlights that many possible roads were ahead for the parties. Pachakutik's failure at achieving its goals could likely push the party towards disbandment or, to the very least, to re-think much of its overall strategies (even a possible primary goal change). In turn, ID's performance signaled the need to re-think the party's strategies to achieve goals. Before, the party had worked to solidify the organization around a single leader instead of working on getting office appointments.

1.2 ID's primary goals and performance between 2006 and 2013

1.2.1 ID's primary goal in 2006 and 2009

ID turned into an office-seeking party during the 2006-2009 and 2009-2013 periods. Table 1.7 summarizes my findings relating to office-seeking parties' indicators for ID's campaigns of 2006 and 2009. Izquierda Democrática ended the 2002-2006 period transitioning from a party that had been under the control of its long-time leader into a party lead by the members that had grown under him. These new leaders, from the outset, signaled their interest in holding office. For the 2006 election, following what is expected of office-seeking parties, ID joined Leon Roldós party and supported him as a candidate. This option had been turned down in 2002. This alliance was, hence, a sign of a change in the party's primary goal. The alliance also included the candidates to the legislature. In 2009 the party's candidates represented different electoral alliances. In this election, the number of alliances ID entered into increased from one (the presidential alliance that extended into the legislative candidates in 2006) to 8 alliances in different provinces.

The campaigns in these two elections differed significantly from the usual campaigns of ID. Nonetheless, in both elections, the candidates emphasized their alliances' brands, and the role ID's colors and slogans had played in previous campaigns was reduced. ID thus showcased signs that the party became an office-oriented party.

¹² The difficulties Pachakutik faced came primarily from the fact that many of the leftist cadres that had contributed to organize the party's actions such as Virgilio Hernandez, Augusto Barrera, and Alberto Acosta left the party giving way to a new indigenous leadership to set-up the organization.

Table 1.7 Electoral campaign indicators for ID as a value-infusion-seeking party

Electoral campaign indicators for ID as an office-seeking party in 2006 and 2009			
	Office-seeking	Izquierda Democrática 2006	Izquierda Democrática 2009
Campaign content	Symbolic (candidate and alliance/coalition oriented).	Symbolic (candidate and alliance/coalition oriented).	Symbolic (candidate and alliance/coalition oriented).
Historical content	Flexible / changing content (adapted to alliances)	Flexible / changing content (adapted to alliances)	Flexible / changing content (adapted to alliances)
Candidates	Office-holder candidates (most likely winner)	Office-holder candidates (locally appointed candidate)	Office-holder candidates (locally appointed candidate)
Alliances	Likely	Alliance with RED	Alliance with many parties
Campaign leaders	Professionals	Professionals	Professionals
Campaign strategies	High tech strategies: including new forms of media and information provision and polling to adjust the campaigns	High tech strategies: including new forms of media and information provision and polling to adjust the campaigns	High tech strategies: including new forms of media and information provision and polling to adjust the campaigns

The 2006 – 2013 period

ID did not survive the requirement of re-registration prescribed by the 2008 Constitution, and in 2013 the party officially disappeared. The death of the party was not unexpected. The first signs of trouble were evident from the 2002-2006 period in which the party leadership changed alongside the party's primary goal. These changes were never entirely accepted by the party's members, who started to flee the party organization. Between 2006 and 2013, ID was unable to achieve its goals.

ID arrived in the 2006-2009 period under the dark cloud of numerous disaffiliations and disappointing electoral results. The party's candidate was not elected president. The party received only 11 seats at the legislature, which, because they were elected under an electoral alliance, meant the party only held six seats at the legislature. ID also faced another problem. The party leaders who agreed to support Roldós and had signaled the importance of securing electoral support and holding office no longer guided the party. Thus, the party changed course. These leaders were replaced by Andrés Páez in January 2007, who did not signal immediate interest in holding office but instead stressed he aspired to turn ID into a policy-oriented party. Páez was the winner of an internal dispute for the party's control. The former leader, Guillermo

Landazuri, was criticized by him and Dalton Bacigalupo, who insisted that Landazuri was not doing a good job at directing the party.

Páez intended to turn ID into a policy-seeking party. ID had little time to develop any clear programmatic positions as Congress was dissolved less than a year after it was installed. The most important policy position ID took during the 2006-2009 period was the null vote campaign against the approval of the 2008 Constitution. ID was unsuccessful at mobilizing the electorate on this. Some of the party's members did secure office appointments during this period. The most important of these appointments was Ramiro González' appointment as President of the Directive Council of the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute (IESS). When González was appointed, he was part of ID, and there is contradictory information about the party's support for the appointment. Gonzalez nevertheless ended up disaffiliating from the party; therefore, it could be argued his appointment had no relationship with the party's performance.

On the whole, ID had no clear direction during the 2006-2009 period and was thus unsuccessful at achieving its goal. In terms of office-holding, the party held a single position that could be equated to a cabinet seat, but the appointment holder soon disaffiliated from the party. In terms of the organization's unity, ID struggled to maintain party members as this period was riddled with disaffiliations.

The 2009-2013 period started with Andrés Páez still holding onto ID's leadership. However, from the outset, he was challenged by Dalton Bacigalupo. In total, ID had four seats (two under a single ticket and two under electoral alliances) at the legislature. The party, as mentioned, did not present a presidential candidate. ID suffered the same fate as Pachakutik at the legislative. It was unable to advance any policy proposal during the period. ID's legislators only presented one bill initiative during the period, which never made it even to the first debate. In terms of office holding, ID had positioned itself as an active opposition – primarily due to the vocal critiques of Páez against Correa – which made it almost impossible for ID's members to access any office appointment. Lastly, and crucially, ID's shaky internal cohesion resulted in a party's failed attempt to secure re-registration. ID had no official records of membership, which meant that, as Pachakutik, the party had to canvas for signatures from scratch (El Comercio, 2010a). ID, unlike Pachakutik, was unable to rally its organizational structure to get these signatures. In 2013 the party was announced as de-registered.

Pachakutik's performance during the 2006-2017 period was clearly better than ID's performance. Pachakutik managed to re-register as a political party by 2012 while ID failed. The 2006-2017 period is the first period in which Pachakutik performed better than its peer

organizations. This performance was moreover better not only in terms of achieving primary goals but overall. Pachakutik also secured the persistence of its organization and advanced policy during the 2009-2013 period. ID, by contrast, neither advanced policy nor did it access office appointments. ID's disbandment was thus expected.