

Position-Based Quantum Cryptography



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Quantum Dummies @Simons

Friday, 22 April 2020



1969: Man on the Moon

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<http://www.unmuseum.org/moonhoax.htm>

- How can you prove that you are at a specific location?

Position-Based Cryptography

Joint work with:

Harry Buhrman

Serge Fehr

Nicolas Gisin

Adrian Kent

Florian Speelman

Hugo Zbinden

Nishanth Chandran

Ran Gelles

Vipul Goyal

Rafail Ostrovsky

...

Outline of the Talk

- Notation & Quantum Teleportation
- Position-Based Cryptography
- No-Go Theorem
- Garden-Hose Model




Quantum Mechanics


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+ basis



$|0\rangle_+$



$|1\rangle_+$



x basis





$|0\rangle_x$






$|1\rangle_x$

Measurements:

with prob. 1 yields 1



0/1



0/1





with prob. $\frac{1}{2}$ yields 0

with prob. $\frac{1}{2}$ yields 1



No-Cloning Theorem


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Proof: copying is a **non-linear operation**

Quantum Teleportation


7 [Bennett Brassard Crépeau Jozsa Peres Wootters 1997]



- does **not contradict relativity theory**
- teleported state can only be recovered once the classical information σ arrives

Port-Based Teleportation

8 [Ishizaka Hiroshima 2008]



- **no correction** operation required
- works only **approximately**
- requires 2^n EPR pairs for teleporting **n** qubits

Outline of the Talk

✓ Notation & Quantum Teleportation

■ Position-Based Cryptography

■ No-Go Theorem

■ Garden-Hose Model



How to Convince Someone of Your Presence at a Location

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<http://www.unmuseum.org/moonhoax.htm>

Basic Task: Position Verification


11

- Prove you are at a **certain location**:
 - launching-missile command comes from within the military headquarters
 - talking to the correct country
 - pizza delivery problem
 - ...
- **building block** for advanced cryptographic tasks:
 - authentication, position-based key-exchange
 - can only decipher message at specific location

Can the geographical location of a player be used as cryptographic credential ?

Basic task: Position Verification


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- Prover wants to convince verifiers that she is at a **particular position**
- no **coalition of (fake) provers**, i.e. not at the claimed position, can convince verifiers
- assumptions:
 - communication at speed of light
 - instantaneous computation
 - verifiers can coordinate

Position Verification: First Try


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■ distance bounding [Brands Chaum '93]

Position Verification: Second Try

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position verification is classically impossible !


[Chandran Goyal Moriarty Ostrovsky: CRYPTO '09]

Equivalent Attacking Game

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$$f(x, y) = (a, b)$$




- independent messages m_x and m_y
- copying classical information
- this is impossible quantumly



Position Verification: Quantum Try

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
[Kent Munro Spiller 03/10]



- Let us study the attacking game

Attacking Game

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


- impossible
- but possible with entanglement!!



Entanglement attack


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- done if $b=1$

Entanglement attack

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- the correct person can reconstruct the qubit in time!
- the scheme is completely broken


more complicated schemes?

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- Different schemes proposed by
 - Chandran, Fehr, Gelles, Goyal, Ostrovsky [2010]
 - Malaney [2010]
 - Kent, Munro, Spiller [2010]
 - Lau, Lo [2010]
- Unfortunately they can all be broken!
 - general **no-go theorem** [Buhrman, Chandran, Fehr, Gelles, Goyal, Ostrovsky, S 2010]

Most General Single-Round Scheme


21



- Let us study the attacking game

Distributed Q Computation in 1 Round


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- tricky **back-and-forth teleportation** [Vaidman 03]
- using a **double exponential amount** of EPR pairs, players succeed with probability arbitrarily close to 1
- improved to exponential in [Beigi König '11]



Using Port-Based Teleportation

23 [Beigi König '11]




Using Port-Based Teleportation

24 [Beigi König '11]



output:



No-Go Theorem


25

- Any position-verification protocol **can be broken**
 - using a double-exponential number of EPR-pairs
 - reduced to single-exponential [Beigi, König'11]
- **Question:** is this optimal?
- Does there exist a protocol such that:
 - any **attack** requires many EPR-pairs
 - **honest** prover and verifiers efficient

Single-Qubit Protocol: SQP_f

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[Kent Munro Spiller 03/10]




$$f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$$

efficiently computable

Attacking Game for SQP_f

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- Define $E(SQP_f)$:= minimum number of EPR pairs required for attacking SQP_f

Outline of the Talk

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- ✓ Position-Based Cryptography
- ✓ No-Go Theorem

- Garden-Hose Model



Buhrman, Fehr, S, Speelman:

The Garden-Hose Model

Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science 2013,


arXiv:1109.2563

The Garden-Hose Model

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$$f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$$

$$x \in \{0, 1\}^n$$



share s waterpipes

$$y \in \{0, 1\}^n$$



The Garden-Hose Model

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$x \in \{0, 1\}^n$


$$f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$$

$f(x, y) = 0$ if water exits @ Alice

$f(x, y) = 1$ if water exits @ Bob



$y \in \{0, 1\}^n$



- based on their inputs, players connect pipes with pieces of hose
- Alice also connects a water tap

The Garden-Hose Model

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$x \in \{0, 1\}^n$


$$f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$$

$f(x, y) = 0$ if water exits @ Alice

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$y \in \{0, 1\}^n$



Garden-Hose complexity of f :

$\text{GH}(f) :=$ minimum number of pipes needed to compute f


Demonstration: Inequality on Two Bits

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$$\begin{aligned}x &= x_1x_2 \\ &= 00\end{aligned}$$


$$\begin{aligned}y &= y_1y_2 \\ &= 10\end{aligned}$$



n-Bit Inequality Puzzle

33

- $\text{GH}(\text{Inequality}) \leq$
 - demonstration: $3n$
 - [Margalit Matsliah '12]: $\sim 1.547n$ (using IBM's SAT solver)



IBM Research >

Ponder This

April 2012

- $\sim 1.536n$, $\sim 1.505n$, $\sim 1.457n$ [Dodson '12], $\sim 1.448n$
- current world-record: $\sim 1.359n$ [Chiu Szegedy et al 13]
- $\text{GH}(\text{Inequality}) \geq n$ [Pietrzak '11]

Inequality with 4 Pipes and 6 Inputs

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
$$x \in \{1, \dots, 6\}$$

$$y \in \{1, \dots, 6\}$$



- Alice knows where water exits if $x=y$

- yields $\frac{4}{\log(6)} \approx 1.547$ pipes per bit



$$x = y$$

$$x \neq y$$




Any f has $\text{GH}(f) \leq 2^{n+1}$

$$f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \longrightarrow \{0, 1\}$$



$x_1 x_2 \dots x_n$

$y_1 y_2 \dots y_n$





Any f has $\text{GH}(f) \leq 2^{n+1}$

$$f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \longrightarrow \{0, 1\}$$



$x_1 x_2 \dots x_n$

$y_1 y_2 \dots y_n$

$\overbrace{00 \dots 0}^n$



$x_1 x_2 \dots x_n$


$f(x, y) = 0$

$\overbrace{11 \dots 1}^n$

$f(x, y) = 0$



⋮



⋮



connects iff
 $f(00 \dots 0, y) = 0$

connects iff
 $f(x, y) = 0$

connects iff
 $f(11 \dots 1, y) = 0$

2^{n+1} pipes

$f(x, y) = 1$

Relationship between
 $E(\text{SQP}_f)$ and $\text{GH}(f)$


$$\text{GH}(f) \geq E(\text{SQP}_f)$$



Garden-Hose




y



Attacking Game



y




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Garden-Hose




y



Attacking Game




y



x , Alice's
telep. keys

y , Bob's
telep. keys



- using x & y , can follow the water/qubit
- correct water/qubit using all measurement outcomes

$$\text{GH}(f) = E(\text{SQP}_f) ?$$

- last slide: $\text{GH}(f) \geq E(\text{SQP}_f)$
- The two models are **not equivalent**:
 - exists f such that $\text{GH}(f) = n$, but $E(\text{SQP}_f) \leq \log(n)$
- **Quantum** garden-hose model:
 - give Alice & Bob also entanglement
 - research question: are the models now equivalent?

Garden-Hose Complexity Theory


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- every f has $\text{GH}(f) \leq 2^{n+1}$
- **Thm:** if f in logspace, then $\text{GH}(f) \leq \text{polynomial}$
 - efficient f & no efficient attack $\Rightarrow P \neq L$
- exist f with $\text{GH}(f)$ **exponential** (counting argument)
- for $g \in \{\text{equality, IP, majority}\}$: $\text{GH}(g) \geq n / \log(n)$
 - techniques from communication complexity


- Many open problems!
- more results by Klauck, Podder in [arxiv:1412.4904](https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.4904)

What Have You Learned from this Talk?

✓ Port-Based Quantum Teleportation




✓ Position-Based Cryptography



What Have You Learned from this Talk?

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No-Go Theorem



- Impossible unconditionally, but attack requires unrealistic amounts of resources



Garden-Hose Model

- Restricted class of single-qubit schemes: SQP_f
- Easily implementable
- **Garden-hose model** to study attacks
- Connections to **complexity theory**



Open Problems

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- Is **Quantum-GH(f)** equivalent to $E(\text{SQP}_f)$?
- Find good lower bounds on $E(\text{SQP}_f)$
- Are there other position-verification schemes?
Connection with non-local games
- Position verification in **higher dimensions**
- **Experimental problems**: handle **losses** and **measurement errors**
- Can we achieve other position-based primitives?
- See overview on <https://homepages.cwi.nl/~schaffne/positionbasedcrypto.php>

Epilogue: Garden-Hoses and QFHE


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Secret key sk

$$b = Dec_{sk}(z)$$

$$z = Enc_{pk}(b)$$



- Prepare client side beforehand to get EPR gadget as quantum evaluation key
- Store all teleportation outcomes in classical FHE